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 Dead zones of the imagination 
On violence, bureaucracy, and interpretive labor 
 
The Malinowski Memorial Lecture, 2006 
 
David GRAEBER, Goldsmiths, University of London 
 
 
 
The experience of bureaucratic incompetence, confusion, and its ability to cause otherwise 
intelligent people to behave outright foolishly, opens up a series of questions about the 
nature of power or, more specifically, structural violence. The unique qualities of violence 
as a form of action means that human relations ultimately founded on violence create 
lopsided structures of the imagination, where the responsibility to do the interpretive labor 
required to allow the powerful to operate oblivious to much of what is going on around 
them, falls on the powerless, who thus tend to empathize with the powerful far more than 
the powerful do with them. The bureaucratic imposition of simple categorical schemes on 
the world is a way of managing the fundamental stupidity of such situations. In the hands of 
social theorists, such simplified schemas can be sources of insight; when enforced through 
structures of coercion, they tend to have precisely the opposite effect.   
Keywords: bureaucracy, violence, simplification, ignorance, imagination, knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This essay is an exploration of certain areas of human life that have tended to 
make anthropologists uncomfortable: those areas of starkness, simplicity, 
obliviousness, and outright stupidity in our lives made possible by violence.1 By 
“violence” here, I am not referring to the kind of occasional, spectacular acts of 
violence that we tend to think of first when the word is invoked, but again, the 
boring, humdrum, yet omnipresent forms of structural violence that define the 
very conditions of our existence, the subtle or not-so-subtle threats of physical 
force that lie behind everything from enforcing rules about where one is allowed to 
                                                
1. This essay is based on the 2006 Malinowski Memorial Lecture entitled “Beyond 
power/knowledge: An exploration of the relation of power, ignorance and stupidity.” It 
is a substantially revised version of the one that, for some years, was available online at 
the LSE website. This version is now meant to be considered the official one for 
reference purposes. 
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sit or stand or eat or drink in parks or other public places, to the threats or physical 
intimidations or attacks that underpin the enforcement of tacit gender norms.  
Let us call these areas of violent simplification. They affect us in almost every 
aspect of our lives. Yet no one likes to talk about them very much. Indeed, one 
might argue that social theorists seem to have a particular aversion to dealing with 
the subject because it raises profound issues of the status of social theory itself, and 
anthropologists dislike talking about them most of all, because anthropologists are 
drawn, above all, to what might be called areas of symbolic richness or density of 
meaning, where “thick description” becomes possible. The preference is 
understandable. But it tends to warp our perceptions of what power actually is, and 
how it operates, in ways that are both decidedly self-serving, and that in 
overlooking structural blindness, effectively become forms of structural blindness 
themselves. 
 
* 
Let me begin with a brief story about bureaucracy. 
Over the last year my mother had a series of strokes. It soon became obvious 
that she would eventually be incapable of living at home without assistance; since 
her insurance would not cover home care, a series of social workers advised us to 
put in for Medicaid. To qualify for Medicaid however, one’s total worth can only 
amount to six thousand dollars. We arranged to transfer her savings—this was, I 
suppose, technically a scam, though it’s a peculiar sort of scam since the 
government employs thousands of social workers whose main work seems to be 
telling citizens how to do it—but shortly thereafter, she had another very serious 
stroke, and found herself in a nursing home undergoing long-term rehabilitation. 
When she emerged from there she would definitely need home care, but there 
was a problem: her social security check was being deposited directly, she was 
barely able to sign her name, so unless I acquired power of attorney over her 
account and was thus able to pay her monthly rent bills for her, the money would 
immediately build up and disqualify her, even after I filled out the enormous raft 
of Medicaid documents I needed to file to qualify her for pending status.  
I went to her bank, picked up the requisite forms, and brought them to the 
nursing home. The documents needed to be notarized. The nurse on the floor 
informed me there was an in-house notary, but I needed to make an appointment; 
she picked up the phone and put me through to a disembodied voice who then 
transferred me to the notary. The notary proceeded to inform me that I first had to 
get authorization from the head of social work, and hung up. So I acquired his 
name and room number and duly took the elevator downstairs, appeared at his 
office—only to discover he was, in fact, the disembodied voice on the phone. The 
head of social work picked up the phone, said “Marjorie, that was me, you’re 
driving this man crazy with this nonsense and you’re driving me crazy too,” and 
proceeded to secure me an appointment for early the next week.  
The next week the notary duly appeared, accompanied me upstairs, made sure 
I’d filled out my side of the form (as had been repeatedly emphasized to me), and 
then, in my mother’s presence, proceeded to fill out her own. I was a little puzzled 
that she didn’t ask my mother to sign anything, only me, but I figured she must 
know what she was doing. The next day I took it to the bank, where the woman at 
the desk took one look, asked why my mother hadn’t signed it, and showed it to 
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her manager who told me to take it back and do it right. Apparently the notary had 
no idea what she was doing. So I got new forms, filled out my side of each, and 
made a new appointment. On the appointed day the notary duly appeared, and 
after some awkward remarks about the difficulties caused by each bank having its 
own, completely different power of attorney form, we proceeded upstairs. I signed, 
my mother signed—with some difficulty—and the next day I returned to the bank. 
Another woman at a different desk examined the forms and asked why I had 
signed the line where it said to write my name and printed my name on the line 
where it said to sign.  
“I did? Well, I just did exactly what the notary told me to do.” 
“But it says clearly ‘signature’ here.” 
“Oh, yes, it does, doesn’t it? I guess she told me wrong. Again. 
Well . . . all the information is still there, isn’t it? It’s just those two bits 
that are reversed. So is it really a problem? It’s kind of pressing and I’d 
really rather not have to wait to make another appointment.”  
“Well, normally we don’t even accept these forms without all the 
signatories being here in person.” 
“My mother had a stroke. She’s bedridden. That’s why I need power of 
attorney in the first place.” 
She said she’d check with the manager, and after ten minutes returned (with the 
manager hanging just within earshot in the background) to announce the bank 
could not accept the forms in their present state—and in addition, even if they were 
filled out correctly, I would still need a letter from my mother’s doctor certifying 
that she was mentally competent to sign such a document.  
I pointed out that no one had mentioned any such letter previously.  
“What?” the manager suddenly interjected. “Who gave you those forms and 
didn’t tell you about the letter?” 
Since the culprit was one of the more sympathetic bank employees, I dodged 
the question, noting instead that in the bankbook it was printed, quite clearly, “in 
trust for David Graeber.” He of course replied that would only matter if she was 
dead. 
As it happened, the whole problem soon became academic: my mother did 
indeed die a few weeks later.  
At the time, I found this experience extremely disconcerting. Having led an 
existence comparatively insulated from this sort of thing, I found myself 
continually asking my friends: is this what ordinary life, for most people, is really 
like? Most were inclined to suspect it was. Obviously, the notary was unusually 
incompetent. Still, I had to spend over a month, not long after, dealing with the 
ramifying consequences of the act of an anonymous clerk in the New York 
Department of Motor Vehicles who inscribed my given name as “Daid”—not to 
mention the Verizon clerk who spelled my surname “Grueber.” Bureaucracies 
public and private appear—for whatever historical reasons—to be organized in such 
a way as to guarantee that a significant proportion of actors will not be able to 
perform their tasks as expected. It also exemplifies what I have come to think of as 
the defining feature of certain utopian forms of practice: that is, ones where those 
maintaining the system, on discovering that it will regularly produce such failures, 
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conclude that the problem is not with the system itself but with the inadequacy of 
the human beings involved—or, indeed, of human beings in general.  
As an intellectual, probably the most disturbing thing was how dealing with 
these forms somehow rendered me stupid too. How could I not have noticed that 
I was printing my name on the line that said “signature” and this despite the fact 
that I had been investing a great deal of mental and emotional energy in the whole 
affair? The problem, I realized, was that most of this energy was going into a 
continual attempt to try to understand and influence whoever, at any moment, 
seemed to have some kind of bureaucratic power over me—when all that was 
required was the accurate interpretation of one or two Latin words, and a correct 
performance of certain purely mechanical functions. Spending so much of my time 
worrying about how not to seem like I was rubbing the notary’s face in her 
incompetence, or imagining what might make me seem sympathetic to various 
bank officials, made me less inclined to notice when they told me to do something 
foolish. It was an obviously misplaced strategy, since insofar as anyone had the 
power to bend the rules they were usually not the people I was talking to; 
moreover, if I did encounter them, I was constantly being reminded that if I did 
complain, even about a purely structural absurdity, the only possible result would 
be to get some junior functionary in trouble.   
As an anthropologist, probably the most curious thing for me was how little 
trace any of this tends to leave in the ethnographic literature. After all, we 
anthropologists have made something of a specialty out of dealing with the rituals 
surrounding birth, marriage, death, and similar rites of passage. We are particularly 
concerned with ritual gestures that are socially efficacious: where the mere act of 
saying or doing something makes it socially true. Yet in most existing societies at 
this point, it is precisely paperwork, rather than any other forms of ritual, that is 
socially efficacious. My mother, for example, wished to be cremated without 
ceremony; my main memory of the funeral home though was of the plump, good-
natured clerk who walked me through a fourteen-page document he had to file in 
order to obtain a death certificate, written in ballpoint on carbon paper so it came 
out in triplicate. “How many hours a day do you spend filling out forms like that?” 
I asked. He sighed. “It’s all I do,” holding up a hand bandaged from some kind of 
incipient carpal tunnel syndrome. But without those forms, my mother would not 
be, legally—hence socially—dead. 
Why, then, are there not vast ethnographic tomes about American or British 
rites of passage, with long chapters about forms and paperwork? There is an 
obvious answer. Paperwork is boring. One can describe the ritual surrounding it. 
One can observe how people talk about or react to it. But when it comes to the 
paperwork itself, there just aren’t that many interesting things one can say about it.  
Anthropologists are drawn to areas of density. The interpretative tools we have 
at our disposal are best suited to wend our way through complex webs of meaning 
or signification: to understand intricate ritual symbolism, social dramas, poetic 
forms, or kinship networks. What all these have in common is that they tend to be 
both infinitely rich, and, at the same time, open-ended. If one sets out to exhaust 
every meaning, motive, or association packed in to a single Swazi Ncwala ritual, 
Balinese cockfight, Zande witchcraft accusation, or Mexican family saga, one could 
easily spend a lifetime; and quite a number of them, if one also sought to trace the 
fan of relations with other elements in the larger social or symbolic fields such 
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work invariably opens up. Paperwork in contrast is designed to be maximally 
simple and self-contained. Even when forms are complex, even bafflingly complex, 
it’s by an endless accretion of very simple yet apparently contradictory components, 
like a maze made out the endless juxtaposition of two or three very simple 
geometrical elements. And like a maze, it doesn’t really open on anything outside 
itself. As a result, there just isn’t very much to interpret. A Geertzian “thick 
description” of a mortgage application, for example, would not really be possible, 
no matter how dense the document. Even if some defiant soul set out to write one 
just to prove it could be done, it would be even harder to imagine anyone actually 
reading it. 
 
II 
Novelists often do manage to make great literature out of the apparent circularity 
and emptiness, not to mention idiocy, of bureaucracy—but largely by embracing it, 
and producing literary works that partake of something like the same mazelike, 
senseless form. As a result, almost all great literature on the subject takes the form 
of horror-comedy. Franz Kafka’s The trial (1925) is of course the paradigm, but 
one can cite any number of others: from Stanislaw Lem’s Memoirs found in a 
bathtub (1961), which is pretty much straight Kafka, to Ismail Kadare’s Palace of 
dreams (1980), Saramago’s All the names (1999), or work that’s simply informed 
by the bureaucratic spirit (e.g., almost anything by Jorge Luis Borges). Joseph 
Heller’s Catch-22 (1961), which takes on military bureaucracies, and Something 
happened (1974), about corporate bureaucracies, are considered latter-day 
masterworks in this genre. As is David Foster Wallace’s The pale king (2011), an 
imaginative meditation on the nature of boredom set in a Midwestern office of the 
US Internal Revenue Service. It’s interesting that just about all these works of 
fiction not only emphasize the comic senselessness of bureaucratic life, but mix it 
with at least undertones of violence. That is to say, they emphasize the very aspects 
most likely to be sidestepped in the social scientific literature.   
Now it’s true there are works of anthropology that echo some of these themes: 
one thinks, for instance, of Jack Goody’s reflection on the idea of the list in The 
domestication of the savage mind (1977), which is just as much about the birth of 
self-enclosing bureaucratic systems of classification as Roland Barthes’ Sade, 
Fourier, Loyola (1971) is about the moment such logic came to be applied—at least 
imaginatively—to absolutely every corporeal aspect of human life: passions, sexual 
acts, or religious devotion. But most are not explicitly about bureaucracy at all. 
Within the anthropological literature on bureaucracy itself, in turn, there are works 
that echo something of the absurdist mode so prevalent in literature: Matthew 
Hull’s work on paperwork as ritual (2008, 2010, 2012), Akhil Gupta’s recent Red 
tape (2012), which directly takes on the failures of Indian bureaucracies to alleviate 
poverty, or Andrew Mathews’ work on the Mexican forestry service (2005, 2011). 
But these are somewhat exceptional. The real core of the anthropological literature 
on bureaucracy, even at the height of the “literary turn,” took the completely 
opposite direction, asking not why bureaucracy produces absurdity, but rather, why 
so many people believe this is the case. The single best-known anthropological 
work on bureaucracy is Michael Herzfeld’s The social production of indifference 
(1992), which begins by framing the question thusly: 
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[I]n most industrial democracies—where the state is supposed to be a 
respecter of persons—people rail in quite predictable ways against the 
evils of bureaucracy. It does not matter that their outrage is often 
unjustified; what counts is their ability to draw on a predictable image of 
malfunction. If one could not grumble about “bureaucracy,” bureaucracy 
itself could not easily exist: both bureaucracy and the stereotypical 
complaints about it are parts of a larger universe that we might call, quite 
simply, the ideology and practice of accountability. (1992: 3) 
To understand the system in cultural terms—that is, to find the areas of symbolic 
richness, rife for anthropological analysis, where its victims can represent 
themselves as Christlike, for example, and imagine local officials as embodiments 
of Oriental Despotism—one has to move out of the offices entirely and into the 
cafes.  
The symbolic roots of Western bureaucracy are not to be sought, in the 
first instance, in the official forms of bureaucracy itself, although 
significant traces may be discovered there. They subsist above all in 
popular reactions to bureaucracy—in the ways in which ordinary people 
actually manage and conceptualize bureaucratic relations. (1992: 8)2 
This is not to say Herzfeld and others who have followed in his wake (e.g., Navaro-
Yashin 2002) explicitly deny that immersion in bureaucratic codes and regulations 
can, in fact, cause people to act in ways that in any other context would be 
considered idiotic. Just about anyone is aware from personal experiences that they 
regularly do. Yet for purposes of cultural analysis, truth is rarely considered an 
adequate explanation. At best one can expect a “yes, but . . . ”—with the 
assumption that the “but” introduces everything that’s really interesting and 
important: for instance, the way that complaints about that idiocy subtly act to 
reinscribe the complainers as subjects within the same moral field of accountability 
that bureaucrats inhabit, the way this creates a certain conception of the nation, 
and so on.  
When we move away from ethnography and enter more rarified domains of 
social theory, even that “yes, but” has been known to disappear. In fact, one often 
finds a remarkable sympathy—dare one say, sense of affinity?—between scholars, 
who generally double as academic bureaucrats, and the bureaucrats they study. 
Consider the hegemonic role, in US social theory, of Max Weber in the 1950s and 
1960s, and of Michel Foucault since the 1970s. Their popularity, no doubt, had 
much to do with the ease with which each could be adopted as a kind of anti-Marx, 
their theories put forth (usually in crudely simplified form) to argue that power is 
not simply or primarily a matter of the control of production but rather a pervasive, 
multifaceted, and unavoidable feature of any social life. I also think it is no 
coincidence that these sometimes appear to be the only two intelligent people in 
human history that honestly believed that bureaucracy is characterized primarily by 
its effectiveness. Weber saw bureaucratic forms of organization—public and 
private—as the very embodiment of impersonal rationality, and as such, so 
obviously superior to all other possible forms of organization that they threatened 
                                                
2. For a good recent summary of the anthropological literature on bureaucracy, see Hoag 
(2011). 
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to engulf everything, locking humanity in a joyless “iron cage,” bereft of spirit and 
charisma (1958: 181). Foucault was more subversive, but in a way that made 
bureaucratic power more effective, not less. In his work on asylums, clinics, 
prisons, and the rest, bodies, subjects—even truth itself—all become the products of 
administrative discourses. Through concepts like governmentality and biopower, 
state bureaucracies end up shaping the parameters of human existence in ways far 
more intimate than anything Weber might have imagined.   
It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that, in either case, their popularity owed 
much to the fact that the American university system during this period had itself 
become increasingly an institution dedicated to producing functionaries for an 
imperial administrative apparatus on a global scale. During the Cold War, this was 
often fairly explicit, especially in the early years when both Boasians like Mead and 
Benedict and Weberians like Geertz often found themselves operating within the 
military-intelligence apparatus, or even funded by CIA fronts (Ross 1998). 3 
Gradually, over the course of the campus mobilizations of the Vietnam War, this 
kind of complicity was made an issue. Max Weber—or, to be more accurate, that 
version of Weber promoted by sociologists like Parsons and Shils (1951), which 
gradually became the basis for State Department “modernization theory”—came to 
be seen as the embodiment of everything radicals wished to reject. But it wasn’t 
long before Foucault, who had been whisked out of his retreat in Tunisia and 
placed in the Collège de France after the uprising of May 1968, began to fill the 
gap. One might even speak here of the gradual emergence of a kind of division of 
labor within American universities, with the optimistic side of Weber reinvented 
(in even more simplified form) for the actual training of bureaucrats under the 
name of “rational choice theory,” while his pessimistic side was relegated to the 
Foucauldians. Foucault’s ascendancy, in turn, was precisely within those fields of 
academic endeavor that both became the haven for former radicals, and were 
almost completely divorced from any access to political power—or, increasingly, 
from any influence on social movements as well. This gave Foucault’s emphasis on 
the “power/knowledge” nexus—the assertion that forms of knowledge are always 
also forms of social power, indeed, the most important forms of social power—a 
particular appeal.  
No doubt, any such pocket historical summary can only be a bit caricaturish 
and unfair. Still, I think there is a profound truth here. It is not just that we are 
drawn to areas of density, where our skills at interpretation are best deployed. We 
also have an increasing tendency to identify what’s interesting with what’s important, 
and to assume places of density are also places of power. The power of 
bureaucracy shows just how much this is often not the case. 
                                                
3. Just to give a sense of the connections here, Geertz was a student of Clyde Kluckhohn 
at Harvard, who was not only “an important conduit for CIA area studies funds” (Ross 
1998), but had contributed the section on anthropology to Parsons and Shils’ famous 
Weberian manifesto for the social sciences, Toward a general theory of action (1951). 
Kluckhohn connected Geertz to MIT’s Center for International Studies, then directed 
by the former CIA Director of Economic Research, which in turn convinced him to 
work on development in Indonesia. The Center had as its declared aim the 
development of “an alternative to Marxism” largely through what came to be known as 
modernization theory (White 2007)—again, on Weberian grounds.  
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This essay is not, however, primarily about bureaucracy—or even about the 
reasons for its neglect in anthropology and related disciplines. It is really about 
violence. What I would like to argue is that situations created by violence—
particularly structural violence, by which I mean forms of pervasive social 
inequality that are ultimately backed up by the threat of physical harm—invariably 
tend to create the kinds of willful blindness we normally associate with bureaucratic 
procedures. To put it crudely: it is not so much that bureaucratic procedures are 
inherently stupid, or even that they tend to produce behavior that they themselves 
define as stupid, but rather, that they are invariably ways of managing social 
situations that are already stupid because they are founded on structural violence. I 
think this approach allows potential insights into matters that are, in fact, both 
interesting and important: for instance, the actual relationship between those forms 
of simplification typical of social theory, and those typical of administrative 
procedures.  
 
III 
We are not used to thinking of nursing homes or banks or even HMOs as violent 
institutions—except perhaps in the most abstract and metaphorical sense. But the 
violence I’m referring to here is not epistemic. It’s quite concrete. All of these are 
institutions involved in the allocation of resources within a system of property 
rights regulated and guaranteed by governments in a system that ultimately rests on 
the threat of force. “Force,” in turn, is just a euphemistic way to refer to violence.  
All of this is obvious enough. What’s of ethnographic interest, perhaps, is how 
rarely citizens in industrial democracies actually think about this fact, or how 
instinctively we try to discount its importance. This is what makes it possible, for 
example, for graduate students to be able to spend days in the stacks of university 
libraries poring over theoretical tracts about the declining importance of coercion 
as a factor in modern life, without ever reflecting on that fact that, had they insisted 
on their right to enter the stacks without showing a properly stamped and validated 
ID, armed men would indeed be summoned to physically remove them, using 
whatever force might be required. It’s almost as if the more we allow aspects of our 
everyday existence to fall under the purview of bureaucratic regulations, the more 
everyone concerned colludes to downplay the fact (perfectly obvious to those 
actually running the system) that all of it ultimately depends on the threat of 
physical harm. 
Actually, one could make the same argument about the way that the term 
“structural violence” itself is deployed in contemporary social theory—because the 
way I am using it here is quite decidedly unconventional. The term itself traces 
back to debates within Peace Studies in the 1960s; it was coined by Johann Galtung 
(1969, 1975; cf. Lawler 1995), to meet the charge that to define “peace” as the 
mere absence of acts of physical assault is to overlook the prevalence of much 
more insidious structures of human exploitation. Galtung felt the term 
“exploitation” was too loaded, owing to its identification with Marxism, and 
proposed as an alternative “structural violence”—i.e., any institutional arrangement 
that, by its very operation, regularly causes physical or psychological harm to a 
certain portion of the population, or imposes limits on their freedom. Structural 
violence could thus be distinguished from both “personal violence” (violence by an 
identifiable human agent) and “cultural violence” (those beliefs and assumptions 
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about the world that justify the infliction of harm). This is the how the term has 
mainly been taken up in the anthropological literature as well (e.g., Bourgois 2001; 
Farmer 2004, 2005; Gupta 2012). Paul Farmer, for instance, writes that he found 
the term apt in describing the suffering and early death of so many of the poor 
Haitian farmers among whom he worked and treated,  
because such suffering is “structured” by historically given (and often 
economically driven) processes and forces that conspire—whether 
through routine, ritual, or, as is more commonly the case, the hard 
surfaces of life—to constrain agency. For many, including most of my 
patients and informants, choices both large and small are limited by 
racism, sexism, political violence, and grinding poverty. (Farmer 2002: 
40) 
In all these formulations, “structural violence” is treated as structures that have 
violent effects, whether or not actual physical violence is involved. This is actually 
quite different from my own formulation, more consonant with the feminist 
tradition (e.g., Scheper-Hughes 1992; Nordstrom and Martin 1992), which sees 
these more as structures of violence—since it is only the constant fear of physical 
violence that makes them possible, and allows them to have violent effects. Racism, 
sexism, poverty, these cannot exist except in an environment defined by the 
ultimate threat of actual physical force. To insist on a distinction only makes sense 
if one wishes, for some reason, to also insist that there could be, for example, a 
system of patriarchy that operated in the total absence of domestic violence, or 
sexual assault—despite the fact that, to my knowledge, no such system has ever 
been observed.  
Given the world as it actually exists, this clearly makes no sense. If, say, there is 
a place where women are excluded from certain spaces for fear of physical or 
sexual assault, what precisely is achieved by making a distinction between actual 
attacks, the fear those attacks inspire, the assumptions that motivate men to carry 
out such assaults or police to feel the victim “had it coming,” and the resultant 
feeling on the part of most women that these are not the kind of spaces women 
really ought to be in? Or, for that matter, to distinguish all of these, in turn, from 
the “economic” consequences of women who cannot be hired for certain jobs as a 
result. They all form a single structure of violence.4  
The ultimate problem with Galtung’s approach, as Catia Confortini (2006) 
notes, is that it views “structures” as abstract, free-floating entities; when what we 
are really referring to here are material processes, in which violence, and the threat 
of violence, play a crucial, constitutive role. In fact one could argue it’s this very 
tendency toward abstraction that makes it possible for everyone involved to 
                                                
4. Hence feminists often note out that “violence against women is structural” (e.g., 
Fregoso 2010: 141; World March of Women 2009) in the sense that actual physical 
attacks and threats underpin the very institutions and arrangements that can then be 
described as “structural violence” because of their effects. Similarly, Confortini (2006: 
350) observes that once one understands “structures” as material processes, one can see 
not only that “direct violence is a tool used to build, perpetuate, and reproduce 
structural violence,” but makes possible our very categories of masculinity and 
femininity to begin with. Hartsock (1989) makes analogous points in her critique of 
Foucault. 
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imagine that the violence upholding the system is somehow not responsible for its 
violent effects.  
Anthropologists would do well not to make the same mistake.     
All this becomes even clearer when one looks at the role of government. In 
many of the rural communities anthropologists are most familiar with, where 
modern administrative techniques are explicitly seen as alien impositions, many of 
these connections are much easier to see. In the part of rural Madagascar where I 
did my fieldwork, for example, that governments operate primarily by inspiring 
fear was seen as obvious. At the same time, in the absence of any significant 
government interference in the minutiae of daily life (via building codes, open 
container laws, the mandatory licensing and insurance of vehicles, and so on), it 
became all the more apparent that the main business of government bureaucracy 
was the registration of taxable property. One curious result was that it was precisely 
the sort of information that was available from the Malagasy archives for the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for the community I was studying—precise 
figures about the size of each family and its holdings in land and cattle (and in the 
earlier period, slaves)—that I was least able to attain for the time I was there, simply 
because that was precisely what most people assumed an outsider coming from the 
capital would be likely to be asking about, and therefore, that which they were least 
inclined to tell them.  
What’s more, one result of the colonial experience was that which might be 
called “relations of command”—basically, any ongoing relationship in which one 
adult renders another an extension of his or her will—had become identified with 
slavery, and slavery, with the essential nature of the state. In the community I 
studied, such associations were most likely to come to the fore when people were 
talking about the great slave-holding families of the nineteenth century whose 
children went on to become the core of the colonial-era administration, largely (it 
was always remarked) by dint of their devotion to education and skill with 
paperwork. In other contexts, relations of command—particularly in bureaucratic 
contexts—were linguistically coded. They were firmly identified with French; 
Malagasy, in contrast, was seen as the language appropriate to deliberation, 
explanation, and consensus-based decision-making. Minor functionaries, when 
they wished to impose arbitrary dictates, would almost invariably switch to French. 
I particularly remember one occasion when an official who had had many 
conversations with me in Malagasy, and had no idea I even understood French, 
was flustered one day to discover me dropping by at exactly the moment everyone 
had decided to go home early. “The office is closed,” he announced, in French, “if 
you have any business you must return tomorrow at 8 AM.” When I pretended 
confusion and claimed, in Malagasy, not to understand French, he proved utterly 
incapable of repeating the sentence in the vernacular, but just kept repeating the 
French over and over. Others later confirmed what I suspected: that if he had 
switched to Malagasy, he would at the very least have had to explain why the office 
had closed at such an unusual time. French is actually referred to in Malagasy as 
“the language of command”—it was characteristic of contexts where explanations, 
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deliberation, and ultimately, consent, was not really required, since they were in 
the final analysis premised on the threat of violence.5  
In Madagascar, bureaucratic power was somewhat redeemed in most people’s 
minds by its tie to education, which was held in near-universal esteem. 
Comparative analysis suggests there is a direct relation, however, between the level 
of violence employed in a bureaucratic system, and the level of absurdity it is seen 
to produce. Keith Breckenridge (2008), for example, has documented at some 
length the regimes of “power without knowledge,” typical of colonial South Africa, 
where coercion and paperwork largely substituted for the need for understanding 
African subjects. The actual installation of apartheid in the 1950s, for example, was 
heralded by a new pass system that was designed to simplify earlier rules that 
obliged African workers to carry extensive documentation of labor contracts, 
substituting a single identity booklet, marked with their “names, locale, fingerprints, 
tax status, and their officially prescribed ‘rights’ to live and work in the towns and 
cities” (Breckenridge 2005: 84), and nothing else. Government functionaries 
appreciated it for streamlining administration, police for relieving them of the 
responsibility of having to actually talk to African workers—the latter universally 
referred to as the dompas (or “stupid pass”), for precisely that reason. Andrew 
Mathews’ (2005, 2011) brilliant ethnography of the Mexican forestry service in 
Oaxaca likewise demonstrates that it is precisely the structural inequality of power 
between government officials and local farmers that allows foresters to remain in a 
kind of ideological bubble, maintaining simple black-and-white ideas about forest 
fires (for instance), that allow them to remain pretty much the only people in 
Oaxaca who don’t understand what effects their regulations actually have.    
There are traces of the link between coercion and absurdity even in the way we 
talk about bureaucracy in English. Note, for example, how most of the colloquial 
terms that specifically refer to bureaucratic foolishness—SNAFU, Catch-22, and the 
like—derive from military slang. More generally, political scientists have long 
observed a “negative correlation,” as David Apter (1965, 1971) put it, between 
coercion and information: that is, while relatively democratic regimes tend to be 
awash in too much information, as everyone bombards political authorities with 
explanations and demands, the more authoritarian and repressive a regime, the 
less reason people have to tell it anything—which is why such regimes are forced to 
rely so heavily on spies, intelligence agencies, and secret police.  
   
IV 
Violence’s capacity to allow arbitrary decisions, and thus to avoid the kind of 
debate, clarification, and renegotiation typical of more egalitarian social relations, is 
obviously what allows its victims to see procedures created on the basis of violence 
as stupid or unreasonable. One might say, those relying on the fear of force are not 
                                                
5. To be fair, one reason that so many who use the term “structural violence” imagine that 
it is possible to have such structures unbacked by physical violence is that they are 
employing a typically liberal definition of “violence” as physical attacks on others, or 
even a typically conservative definition of violence as unauthorized damage to persons 
of property, rather than the more typically radical definition of violence as including 
threats of physical attack (Coady 1986; cf. Graeber 2009: 448–49.) 
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obliged to engage in a lot of interpretative labor, and thus, generally speaking, do 
not.  
This is not an aspect of violence that has received much attention in the 
burgeoning “anthropology of violence” literature. The latter has tended instead to 
move in exactly the opposite direction, emphasizing the ways that acts of violence 
are meaningful and communicative. Neil Whitehead, for instance, in a recent 
collection simply entitled Violence (2004), goes so far as to insist that anthropolo-
gists need to examine why people are ever wont to speak of “meaningless violence” 
at all. Violence, he suggests, is best understood as analogous with poetry:  
Violent actions, no less than any other kind of behavioral expression, are 
deeply infused with cultural meaning and are the moment for individual 
agency within historically embedded patterns of behavior. Individual 
agency, utilizing extant cultural forms, symbols, and icons, may thus be 
considered “poetic” for the rule-governed substrate that underlies it, and 
for how this substrate is deployed, through which new meanings and 
forms of cultural expression emerge. (Whitehead 2004: 9–10) 
When I object to this emphasis on the meaningful nature of violence, I’m not 
trying to suggest that the fundamental point is in any way untrue. It would be 
absurd to deny that acts of violence are, typically, meant as acts of communication, 
or that they tend to be surrounded by symbols and generate myths. Yet it seems to 
me that, just as in the case of bureaucracy, this is an area where anthropologists are 
particularly inclined to confuse interpretive depth with social significance: that is, to 
assume that the most interesting aspect of violence is also, necessarily, the most 
important. Yes, violent acts tend to have a communicative element. But this is true 
of any other form of human action as well. It strikes me that what is really 
important about violence is that it is perhaps the only form of human action that 
holds out even in the possibility of having social effects without being 
communicative.  
To be more precise: violence may well be the only form of human action by 
which it is possible to have relatively predictable effects on the actions of a person 
about whom you understand nothing. Pretty much any other way one might try to 
influence another’s actions, one at least has to have some idea who they think they 
are, who they think you are, what they might want out of the situation, and what 
their aversions and proclivities are. Hit them over the head hard enough and all of 
this becomes irrelevant.  
It is true that the effects one can have by disabling or killing someone are very 
limited, but they are real enough—and critically, it is possible to know in advance 
exactly what they will be. Any alternative form of action cannot, without some sort 
of appeal to shared meanings or understandings, have any predictable effects at all. 
What’s more, while attempts to influence others by the threat of violence do 
require some level of shared understanding, these can be pretty minimal. Most 
human relations—particularly ongoing ones, whether between longstanding friends 
or longstanding enemies—are extremely complicated, dense with experience and 
meaning. Maintaining them requires a constant and often subtle work of 
interpretation, of endlessly imagining others’ points of view. Threatening others 
with physical harm allows the possibility of cutting through all this. It makes 
possible relations of a far more schematic kind (i.e., “cross this line and I will shoot 
you”). This is of course why violence is so often the preferred weapon of the stupid. 
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Indeed, one might say it is one of the tragedies of human existence that this is the 
one form of stupidity to which it is most difficult to come up with an intelligent 
response.  
I do need to introduce one crucial qualification here. If two parties engaged in a 
relatively equal contest of violence—say, generals commanding opposing armies—
they have good reason to try to get inside each other’s heads. It is really only when 
one side has an overwhelming advantage in their capacity to cause physical harm 
that they no longer need to do so. But this has very profound effects, because it 
means that the most characteristic effect of violence—its ability to obviate the need 
for what I would call “interpretive labor”—becomes most salient when the violence 
itself is least visible, in fact, where acts of spectacular physical violence are least 
likely to occur. These are situations of what I’ve referred to as structural violence, 
on the assumption that systematic inequalities backed up by the threat of force can 
be treated as forms of violence in themselves. For this reason, situations of 
structural violence invariably produce extreme lopsided structures of imaginative 
identification. 
These effects are often most visible when the structures of inequality take the 
most deeply internalized forms. A constant staple of 1950s American situation 
comedies, for example, was jokes about the impossibility of understanding women. 
The jokes (always, of course, told by men) represented women’s logic as 
fundamentally alien and incomprehensible. One never had the impression the 
women in question had any trouble understanding men. The reasons are obvious: 
women had no choice but to understand men; this was the heyday of a certain 
image of the patriarchal family, and women with no access to their own income or 
resources had little choice but to spend a great deal of time and energy 
understanding what their menfolk thought was going on. Hopefully, at this point, I 
do not have to point out that patriarchal arrangements of this sort are prima facie 
examples of structural violence; they are norms sanctioned by the threat of physical 
harm in endless subtle and not-so-subtle ways. And this kind of rhetoric about the 
mysteries of womankind appears to be a perennial feature of them. Generations of 
women novelists—Virginia Woolf comes most immediately to mind (e.g., Woolf 
1927)—have also documented the other side of such arrangements: the constant 
efforts women end up having to expend in managing, maintaining, and adjusting 
the egos of oblivious and self-important men, involve a continual work of 
imaginative identification, or what I’ve called “interpretive labor.” This carries over 
on every level. Women are always expected to imagine what things look like from 
a male point of view. Men are almost never expected to reciprocate. So deeply 
internalized is this pattern of behavior that many men react to the suggestion that 
they might do otherwise, as if it were an act of violence in itself. A popular exercise 
among high school creative writing teachers in America, for example, is to ask 
students to imagine they have been transformed, for a day, into someone of the 
opposite sex, and describe what that day might be like. The results, apparently, are 
uncannily uniform. The girls all write long and detailed essays that clearly show 
they have spent a great deal of time thinking about the subject. Usually, a good 
proportion of the boys refuse to write the essay entirely. Those who do make it 
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clear they have not the slightest conception what being a teenage girl might be like, 
and deeply resent having to think about it.6  
Nothing I am saying here is particularly new to anyone familiar with Feminist 
Standpoint Theory or Critical Race Studies. Indeed, I was originally inspired to 
these broader reflections by a passage by bell hooks:  
Although there has never been any official body of black people in the 
United States who have gathered as anthropologists and/or ethnog-
raphers to study whiteness, black folks have, from slavery on, shared in 
conversations with one another “special” knowledge of whiteness 
gleaned from close scrutiny of white people. Deemed special because it 
is not a way of knowing that has been recorded fully in written material, 
its purpose was to help black folks cope and survive in a white 
supremacist society. For years black domestic servants, working in white 
homes, acted as informants who brought knowledge back to segregated 
communities—details, facts, psychoanalytic readings of the white “Other.” 
(hooks 1992: 165) 
If there is a flaw in the feminist literature, I would say, it’s that it can be, if anything, 
too generous, tending to emphasize the insights of the oppressed over the 
blindness or foolishness of their oppressors.7  
Could it be possible to develop a general theory of interpretive labor? We’d 
probably have to begin by recognizing that there are two critical elements here that, 
while linked, need to be formally distinguished. The first is the process of 
imaginative identification as a form of knowledge, the fact that within relations of 
domination, it is generally the subordinates who are effectively relegated the work 
of understanding how the social relations in question really work. Anyone who has 
ever worked in a restaurant kitchen, for example, knows that if something goes 
terribly wrong and an angry boss appears to size things up, he is unlikely to carry 
out a detailed investigation, or even, to pay serious attention to the workers all 
scrambling to explain their version of what happened. He is much more likely to 
tell them all to shut up and arbitrarily impose a story that allows instant judgment: 
i.e., “you’re the new guy, you messed up—if you do it again, you’re fired.” It’s those 
who do not have the power to hire and fire who are left with the work of figuring 
out what actually did go wrong so as to make sure it doesn’t happen again. The 
same thing usually happens with ongoing relations: everyone knows that servants 
tend to know a great deal about their employers’ families, but the opposite almost 
                                                
6. Obviously, the immediate reason teenage boys object to imagining themselves as girls is 
homophobia; but one then has to ask why that homophobia is so powerful in the first 
place, and why it takes the form that it does. After all, many teenage girls are equally 
homophobic, but it does not seem to stop them from taking pleasure in imagining 
themselves as boys. 
7. The key texts on Standpoint Theory, by Patricia Hill Collins, Donna Haraway, Sandra 
Harding, Nancy Hartsock and others, are collected in a volume edited by Harding 
(2004). I might add that the history of this very essay provides a telling example of the 
sort of gendered obliviousness I’m describing. When I first framed the problem, I 
wasn’t even aware of this body of literature, though my argument had clearly been 
indirectly influenced by it—it was only the intervention of a feminist friend, Erica 
Lagalisse, who put me on to where many of these ideas were actually coming from.  
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never occurs. The second element is the resultant pattern of sympathetic 
identification. Curiously, it was Adam Smith, in his Theory of moral sentiments 
(1762), who first observed the phenomenon we now refer to as “compassion 
fatigue.” Human beings, he proposed, are normally inclined not only to 
imaginatively identify with their fellows, but as a result, to spontaneously feel one 
another’s joys and sorrows. The poor, however, are so consistently miserable that 
otherwise sympathetic observers face a tacit choice between being entirely 
overwhelmed, or simply blotting out their existence. The result is that while those 
on the bottom of a social ladder spend a great deal of time imagining the 
perspectives of, and genuinely caring about, those on the top, it almost never 
happens the other way around.  
Whether one is dealing with masters and servants, men and women, employers 
and employees, rich and poor, structural inequality—what I’ve been calling 
structural violence—invariably creates highly lopsided structures of the imagination. 
Since I think Smith was right to observe that imagination tends to bring with it 
sympathy, the result is that victims of structural violence tend to care about its 
beneficiaries far more than those beneficiaries care about them. This might well be, 
after the violence itself, the single most powerful force preserving such relations. 
 
V 
All this, I think, has some interesting theoretical implications. 
Now, in contemporary industrialized democracies, the legitimate administration 
of violence is turned over to what is euphemistically referred to as “law 
enforcement”—particularly, to police officers, whose real role, as police sociologists 
have repeatedly emphasized (e.g., Bittner 1970, 1985; Waddington 1999; 
Neocleous 2000), has much less to do with enforcing criminal law than with the 
scientific application of physical force to aid in the resolution of administrative 
problems. Police are, essentially, bureaucrats with weapons. At the same time, they 
have significantly, over the last fifty years or so, become the almost obsessive 
objects of imaginative identification in popular culture. It has come to the point 
that it’s not at all unusual for a citizen in a contemporary industrialized democracy 
to spend several hours a day reading books, watching movies, or viewing TV shows 
that invite them to look at the world from a police point of view, and to vicariously 
participate in their exploits. If nothing else, all this throws an odd wrinkle in 
Weber’s dire prophecies about the iron cage: as it turns out, faceless bureaucracies 
do seem inclined to throw up charismatic heroes of a sort, in the form of an 
endless assortment of mythic detectives, spies, and police officers—all, significantly, 
figures whose job is to operate precisely where the bureaucratic structures for 
ordering information encounter, and appeal to, genuine physical violence.  
Even more striking, I think, are the implications for the status of theory itself.  
Bureaucratic knowledge is all about schematization. In practice, bureaucratic 
procedure invariably means ignoring all the subtleties of real social existence and 
reducing everything to preconceived mechanical or statistical formulae. Whether 
it’s a matter of forms, rules, statistics, or questionnaires, it is always a matter of 
simplification. Usually it’s not so different than the boss who walks into the kitchen 
to make arbitrary snap decisions as to what went wrong: in either case it is a matter 
of applying very simple preexisting templates to complex and often ambiguous 
situations. The result often leaves those forced to deal with bureaucratic 
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administration with the impression that they are dealing with people who have, for 
some arbitrary reason, decided to put on a set of glasses that only allows them to 
see only two percent of what’s in front of them. But doesn’t something very similar 
happen in social theory? An ethnographic description, even a very good one, 
captures at best two percent of what’s happening in any particular Nuer feud or 
Balinese cockfight. A theoretical work will normally focus on only a tiny part of 
that, plucking perhaps one or two strands out of an endlessly complex fabric of 
human circumstance, and using them as the basis on which to make 
generalizations: say, about the dynamics of social conflict, the nature of 
performance, or the principle of hierarchy. I am not trying to say there’s anything 
wrong in this kind of theoretical reduction. To the contrary, I am convinced some 
such process is necessary if one wishes to say something dramatically new about 
the world.  
Consider the role of structural analysis, so famously endorsed by Edmund 
Leach in the first Malinowski Memorial Lecture (1959) almost half a century ago. 
Nowadays structural analysis is considered definitively passé, and Claude Lévi-
Strauss’ corpus, vaguely ridiculous. This strikes me as unfortunate. Certainly the 
idea that structuralism provides some kind of genetic key to unlock the mysteries 
of human culture has been justifiably abandoned; but to likewise abandon even the 
practice of structural analysis, it seems to me, robs us of one our most ingenious 
tools. Because the great merit of structural analysis is that it provides a well-nigh 
foolproof technique for doing what any good theory should do, namely simplifying 
and schematizing complex material in such a way as to be able to say something 
unexpected. This is incidentally how I came up with the point about Weber and 
heroes of bureaucracy three paragraphs above. It all came from an experiment 
demonstrating structural analysis to students at a seminar in Yale; I had just laid 
out how vampires could be conceived as structural inversions of werewolves (and 
Frankenstein, of the Mummy), and someone suggested we try the same thing on 
other genres. I quickly established, to my own satisfaction at least, that James Bond 
was a structural inversion of Sherlock Holmes (see figure 1). It was in mapping out 
the field that became visible once we set out that initial opposition that I came to 
realize that everything here was organized precisely around the relation between 
information and violence—just as one would expect for heroes of a bureaucratic 
age. 
For my own part, I prefer to see someone like Lévi-Strauss as a heroic figure, a 
man with the sheer intellectual courage to pursue his model as far as it would go, 
no matter how obviously absurd the results could sometimes be—or, if you prefer, 
how much violence he thus did to reality.  
As long as one remains within the domain of theory, then, I would argue that 
simplification can be a form of intelligence. The problems arise when the violence 
is no longer metaphorical. Here let me turn from imaginary cops to real ones. A 
former LAPD officer turned sociologist (Cooper 1991), observed that the 
overwhelming majority of those beaten by police turn out not to be guilty of any 
crime. “Cops don’t beat up burglars,” he observed. The reason, he explained, is 
simple: the one thing most guaranteed to evoke a violent reaction from police is to 
challenge their right to “define the situation.” If what I’ve been saying is true, then 
this is just what we’d expect. The police truncheon is precisely the point where the 
state’s bureaucratic imperative for imposing simple administrative schema, and its 
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monopoly of coercive force, come together. It only makes sense then that 
bureaucratic violence should consist first and foremost of attacks on those who 
insist on alternative schemas or interpretations. At the same time, if one accepts 
Piaget’s (1936) famous definition of mature intelligence as the ability to coordinate 
between multiple perspectives (or possible perspectives) one can see, here, 
precisely how bureaucratic power, at the moment it turns to violence, becomes 
literally a form of infantile stupidity. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. James Bond as a Structural Inversion of Sherlock Holmes. 
 
If I had more time I would suggest why I feel this approach could suggest new ways 
to consider old problems. From a Marxian perspective, for example, one might 
note that my notion of “interpretive labor” that keeps social life running smoothly 
implies a fundamental distinction between the domain of social production (the 
production of persons and social relations) where the imaginative labor is relegated 
to those on the bottom, and a domain of commodity production where the 
imaginative aspects of work are relegated to those on the top. In either case, 
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though, structures of inequality produce lopsided structures of the imagination. I 
would also propose that what we are used to calling “alienation” is largely the 
subjective experience of living inside such lopsided structures. This in turn has 
implications for any liberatory politics.8 For present purposes, though, let me just 
draw attention to some of the implications for anthropology. 
One is that many of the interpretive techniques we employ have, historically, 
served as weapons of the weak far more often than as instruments of power. In an 
essay in Writing culture, Renato Rosaldo (1986) made a famous argument that 
when Evans-Pritchard, annoyed that no one would speak to him, ended up gazing 
at a Nuer camp of Muot Dit “from the door of his tent,” he rendered it equivalent 
to a Foucauldian Panopticon. The logic seems to be that any knowledge gathered 
under unequal conditions serves a disciplinary function. To me, this is absurd. 
Bentham’s Panopticon was a prison. There were guards. Prisoners endured the 
gaze, and internalized its dictates, because if they tried to escape, or resist, they 
could be punished, even killed. 9  Absent the apparatus of coercion, such an 
observer is reduced to the equivalent of a neighborhood gossip, deprived even of 
the sanction of public opinion.  
Underlying the analogy, I think, is the assumption that comprehensive 
knowledge of this sort is an inherent part of any imperial project. Even the briefest 
examination of the historical record though makes clear that empires tend to have 
little or no interest in documenting ethnographic material. They tend to be 
interested instead in questions of law and administration. For information on 
exotic marriage customs or mortuary ritual, one almost invariably has to fall back 
on travelers’ accounts—on the likes of Herodotus, Ibn Battuta, or Zhang Qian—that 
is, on descriptions of those lands which fell outside the jurisdiction of whatever 
state the traveler belonged to.10  
Historical research reveals that the inhabitants of Muot Dit were, in fact, largely 
former follows of a prophet named Gwek who had been victims of RAF bombing 
and forced displacement the year before (Johnson 1979, 1982, 1994)—the whole 
affair being occasioned by fairly typical bureaucratic foolishness (basic 
misunderstandings about the nature of power in Nuer society, attempts to separate 
Nuer and Dinka populations that had been entangled for generations, and so 
forth). When Evans-Pritchard was there they were still subject to punitive raids 
from the British authorities. Evans-Pritchard was asked to go to Nuerland basically 
as a spy. At first he refused, then finally agreed; he later said because he “felt sorry 
for them.” He appears to have carefully avoided gathering the specific information 
                                                
8. I have explored some of these implications—concerning both alienation and liberatory 
politics—further in an essay called “Revolution in reverse” (Graeber 2011). 
9. In fact, the way the image of the panopticon has been adopted in the academy, as an 
argument against the primacy of violence in contemporary forms of power, might be 
considered a perfect example of how academics can become complicit in the process 
by which structures founded on violence can represent themselves as something else. 
10. It would be interesting to document the ebb and flow of ethnographic interest within 
different historical empires to see if there are any consistent patterns. As far as I’m 
aware, the first large empire that gathered systematic ethnographic, culinary, medical, 
and similar information from within the empire were the Mongols.  
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the authorities were really after (mainly, about the prophets that they saw as leaders 
of resistance), while, at the same time, doing his best to use his more general 
insights into the workings of Nuer society to discourage some of their more idiotic 
abuses, as he put it, to “humanize” the authorities (Johnson 1982: 245). As an 
ethnographer, then, he ended up doing something very much like traditional 
women’s work: keeping the system from disaster by tactful interventions meant to 
protect the oblivious and self-important men in charge from the consequences of 
their blindness.  
Would it have been better to have kept one’s hands clean? These strike me as 
questions of personal conscience. I suspect the greater moral dangers lie on an 
entirely different level. The question for me is whether our theoretical work is 
ultimately directed at undoing or dismantling some of the effects of these lopsided 
structures of imagination, or whether—as can so easily happen when even our best 
ideas come to be backed up by bureaucratically administered violence—we end up 
reinforcing them.  
 
VI 
Social theory itself could be seen as a kind of radical simplification, a form of 
calculated ignorance, meant to reveal patterns one could never otherwise be able 
to see. This is as true of this essay as of any other. If this essay has largely 
sidestepped the existing anthropological literature on bureaucracy, violence, or 
even ignorance,11 it is not because I don’t believe this literature offers insight, but 
rather because I wanted to see what different insights could be gained by looking 
through a different lens—or, one might even say, a different set of blinders.  
Still, some blinders have different effects than others. I began the essay as I 
did—about the paperwork surrounding my mother’s illness and death—to make a 
point. There are dead zones that riddle our lives, areas so devoid of any possibility 
of interpretive depth that they seem to repel any attempt to give them value or 
meaning. They are spaces, as I discovered, where interpretive labor no longer 
works. It’s hardly surprising that we don’t like to talk about them. They repel the 
imagination. But if we ignore them entirely, we risk becoming complicit in the very 
violence that creates them.  
It is one thing to say that, when a master whips a slave, he is engaging in a form 
of meaningful, communicative action, conveying the need for unquestioning 
obedience, and at the same time trying to create a terrifying mythic image of 
absolute and arbitrary power. All of this is true. It is quite another to insist that is 
                                                
11. There has been of late a minor boomlet in anthropological studies of ignorance (e.g., 
Gershon and Raj 2000; Scott 2000; Dilley 2010; High, Kelly, and Mair 2012), and 
some of the more recent examples even take some of the arguments of my original 
Malinowski lecture into consideration. But even here, one can observe at least a slight 
tug pulling in the opposite direction, as when High, Kelly, and Mair suggest, in their 
introduction, that while a political critique approach to the subject is not invalid, a 
distinctively “ethnographic approach” must mean seeing ignorance not in purely 
negative terms, as the absence of knowledge, but “as a substantive phenomenon with its 
own history” and therefore to understand its “productivity” (2012: 15–16). This of 
course sounds very much like Foucault on power. Ethnography abhors a vacuum. But 
vacuums do exist. 
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all that is happening, or all that we need to talk about. After all, if we do not go on 
to explore what “unquestioning” actually means—the master’s ability to remain 
completely unaware of the slave’s understanding of any situation, the slave’s 
inability to say anything even when she becomes aware of some dire practical flaw 
in the master’s reasoning, the forms of blindness or stupidity that result, the fact 
these oblige the slave to devote even more energy trying to understand and 
anticipate the master’s confused perceptions—are we not, in however small a way, 
doing the same work as the whip? There is a reason why Elaine Scarry (1985: 28) 
called torture a form of “stupidity.” It’s not really about making its victims talk. 
Ultimately, it’s about the very opposite. 
There is another reason I began with that story. As my apparently inexplicable 
confusion over the signatures makes clear, such dead zones can, temporarily at 
least, render anybody stupid—in the same way, ultimately, as my position as a male 
academic could make it possible for me to write a first draft of this essay entirely 
oblivious to the fact that many of its arguments were simply reproducing 
commonplace feminist ideas. All of these forms of blindness ultimately stem from 
trying to navigate our way through situations made possible by structural violence. 
It will take enormous amount of work to begin to clear away these dead zones. But 
recognizing their existence is a necessary first step. 
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Zones mortes de l’imagination : réflexions sur la violence, la 
bureaucratie, et le travail interprétatif 
 
Résumé : L’expérience de l’incompétence et de la confusion bureaucratique, de 
sa capacité à engendrer chez des personnes intelligentes des comportements 
stupides, nous invite à un questionnement sur la nature du pouvoir, ou plus 
précisément la violence structurelle. Les qualités spécifiques de la violence comme 
forme d’action font que les relations humaines fondées sur la violence créent des 
structures déséquilibrées de l’imagination. Au sein de telles structures, le travail 
interprétatif permettant aux puissants d’agir dans l’ignorance de ce qui se passe 
autour d’eux revient aux sans-pouvoirs qui ont alors tendance à avoir plus 
d’empathie envers ceux détenant le pouvoir que ces derniers n’en ont envers eux. 
L’imposition bureaucratique de schémas catégoriels simples sur le monde est une 
manière de gérer la stupidité fondamentale de telles situations. Pour les théoriciens 
sociaux, de tels schémas simplifiés peuvent devenir des sources de connaissance ; 
lorsqu’appliqués au moyen de structures de coercition, ils ont tendance à avoir 
exactement l’effet inverse. 
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